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COLONIAL LABOUR POLICY AND RHODESIA
JOHN M. MACKENZIE
The labour policies which were applied in Rhodesia in the early years 
of colonial rule had their origins in nineteenth century colonial labour policy 
as formulated after the abolition of slavery. This article sets out to examine 
the origins of policies which were framed both in the wider colonial context 
and in South Africa, particularly Natal, and the application of them to 
Rhodesia. To understand early Rhodesian ideas upon labour, it is necessary 
to understand the origins of the concept of labour itself, its applications in 
the colonial environment, theories of tropical abundance and tropical in­
dolence, notions of ineffcient indigenous labour and of target working, the 
relationship among land, tax, and labour, and the development of the 
indentured labour policy. It will be argued that after the abolition of slavery 
in the British Empire, the principal problem in the colonial setting was that 
the position of labour vis-^-vis capital was a powerful one. The prime object 
of colonial labour policies was therefore to shift the balance of power in 
colonial economies in the direction of capital.
I
The emergence of the concept of labour as a moral imperative was 
closely bound up with the notion of tropical abundance. When labour was 
viewed as an unpleasant necessity, tropical abundance, whether myth or 
reality, was seen as a great good. The works on exploration of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries saw the tropical Eldorado as much in terms of 
agricultural luxuriance as in terms of mineral wealth. In the eighteenth 
century, however, labour emerged as a moral necessity, the sine qua non of 
civilisation, even at times equated with civilisation itself. Whether this was a 
result of enclosure and embryonic industrialism in Britain, a result of the 
thinking of the Scottish philosophers and the Evangelicals, the extension of 
the Calvinist ethic, or the shift from commercial to industrial capitalism need 
not concern us here. The great significance of labour in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century thought receives ample testimony in the attempts 
to use labour as a currency in the West Africa utopias of Granville Sharp and 
others,' and in the labour theory of value of the classical economists. In the 
face of this apotheosis of labour tropical abundance came to be seen as a 
great evil, a barrier to civilisation, a temptation to indolence and “animal 
existence”.
The notion of tropical indolence was a highly resistant one: it persisted 
in writings from the late eighteenth century to well into the twentieth century. 
Philip Curtin in his Image of Africa has charted the spread of the idea in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. At a later date, it can be 
found in the works of men as different as Herman Merivale and Henry 
Taylor, Samuel Baker and J. A. Hobson, the 3rd Earl Grey and Cecil Rhodes, 
Alfred Milner and Harry Johnston, Sidney Olivier and Frederick Lugard.2 
In the writings of this merely representative sample, tropical indolence came 
to be linked with stimulation to labour, and therefore to civilisation, racial 
displacement, the loss of land rights, and the “child view”. All of these 
implied that little value could be found in indigenous tropical economies, 
despite all appearances to the contrary in West Africa.
Earl Grey, in a celebrated despatch to Governor Torrington of Ceylon,
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wrote that in European countries the labouring classes had sufficient “motive 
to exertion” through the discomforts of their situation, and that therefore 
governments ought to avoid enhancing the cost of subsistence by taxing 
them, but that in tropical countries a comfortable existence could easily be 
achieved, and in consequence races inhabiting the tropics tended to “sink 
into an easy and listless mode of life, quite incompatible with any high degree 
of civilisation”.3 Herman Merivale, Grey’s permanent under-secretary at the 
Colonial Office, wrote in his Oxford Lectures On Colonisation and Colonies 
of “amalgamation”, which he described as the “only possible euthanasia of 
savage communities”.4 By amalgamation he meant social, economic, cultural, 
and even genetic union, for he asserted the superior energy of half-castes.5 
The implication was of course that the societies and economies of such 
“savage communities” were valueless. In a similar but even more extra­
ordinary thesis, which may be called the theory of miraculous eugenics, Sir 
Harry Johnston asserted that “rills of Caucasian blood” would circulate 
through black Africa, producing a compromise, “a dark-skinned race with a 
white man’s features and a white man’s brain”.6 Eccentric as these ideas 
were—and Merivale himself thought they would be regarded as “wild and 
chimerical”7—they reflect an idea prevalent throughout the nineteenth 
century, that the cultures of “savage races” must inevitably collapse in the 
face of white civilisation and the craving for labour which sustained it. The 
alleged experience of North America and Australasia was extrapolated to 
Africa.
But even if black cultures were not to collapse, tropical indolence 
entailed loss of rights. Rhodes spoke of an “inexorable law” by which 
Africans would “lose their country” if they were not made worthy of it by 
being dissuaded from sitting in idleness and by being trained in the “arts of 
civilisation”.8 Even J. A. Hobson, liberal journalist and the true originator 
of the theory of capitalist imperialism wrote “The resources of the tropics 
will not be developed voluntarily by the natives themselves”.9 For him white 
men would by organising and superintending the labour of Africans educate 
them “in the arts of industry and stimulate in them a desire for material and 
moral progress, implanting new ‘wants’ which form in every society the roots 
of civilisation”. The view of the “official mind” closely linked tropical 
indolence with the “child view”. Milner wrote of the necessity for native 
commissioners to place positive moral pressure on Africans to work and stated 
as his justification that “the black man is naturally inclined, much more than 
the white, to do nothing at all”.10 To Sidney Olivier, a Fabian colonial 
governor and Secretary of State for India in the first Labour government of 
1924, the African had “no mechanical habit of industry . . .  no idea of any 
obligation to be industrious for industry’s sake, no conception of any essential 
dignity of labour itself, no delight in gratuitous toil”," while for Lord Lugard 
the African held “the position of a late born child in the family of nations, 
and must as yet be schooled in the discipline of the nursery”.12 The Church 
gave its sanction to this view. For the Bishop of Mashonaland in 1900 
polygamy was the great evil, holding men from work since they could exist 
on the labours of their wives. Doing “our duty to the native races of the 
countries Providence has given us” involved teaching them the necessity of 
working “with body or brains”.13 It is in this context that the survival of 
forced labour in British colonies up to the Second World War must be 
understood.14
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II
Two events were crucial in the development of colonial labour theory 
and policies in the nineteenth century. One was the abolition of slavery in 
the British Empire in 1833, or perhaps more significantly, the premature 
ending of the “apprenticeship system” in 1838. The other was the rapid 
dismantling of tariffs and the advent of Free Trade after 1846. The classic 
plantation ‘hinterland of exploitation” had been a closed system, dependent 
on imports of slave labour, producing entirely for export, and creating a rigid 
social hierarchy. The abolition of slavery and the demolition of the mercantile 
structure destroyed that closed system.15 The fortunes of the West Indian 
islands and to a lesser extent of Mauritius were the principal headache of 
the metropole in the post mercantile age. The metropole, influenced now 
by industrial rather than mercantile capital, had shifted the terms of trade 
in the direction of itself, and it had to offer a quid pro quo to the plantocracies. 
This quid pro quo was the provision of labour, and the facilitating of the 
movement of labour from areas of labour aboundance to areas of labour 
shortage became the standard response of the metropole to the cries for help 
from the periphery. With the ending of protection, West Indian and Indian 
Ocean sugar was in direct competition with the slave-grown sugar of Brazil 
and Cuba. It was essential for survival to make free labour as cheap as, if 
not cheaper than, slave labour. Arguments about the continuation or destruc­
tion of protection were invariably reduced to arguments about the labour 
supply, and the necessity for colonial regulation of that supply in the post­
slavery period. Lord John Russell specifically said that the West Indies should 
be bolstered with labour rather than with protection.16
The removal of coercion from the labour supply introduced a need for 
an entirely new relationship with labour on the part of the plantocracies. 
Moreover, the connection between labour supply and the land was soon 
apparent. In those colonies where there was an abundance of spare land, 
the ex-slaves departed in search of plots for themselves. In Jamaica, in 
British Guiana, and in Trinidad, capitalist plantations constituted a very 
small part of the total area. In these colonies, almost all labour disappeared. 
Despite the cries of black sloth and relapse into barbarism of the planters 
and colonial officials alike, visitors to the old slave colonies found a con­
siderable improvement in conditions outside the plantation sector. One 
Sewell, who visited Trinidad in 1846, wrote of the improvement of the condi­
tion of those who had left the estates, many of whom now owned the plots 
of from one to ten acres, and had become traders, whether owning a store 
or selling a few mangoes in the street.17 In Mauritius, labourers could now 
earn more in a few days’ loading than they could earn in a month on a 
plantation. Given the insufficiency of labour, wages began to rise. Emancipa­
tion, to a far greater degree than expected, had suddenly reversed the balance 
of power between capital and labour. But observers were not slow to note 
that in St. Kitts in the Leeward Islands or in Barbados, where there was no 
spare land, the planters had an abundance of labour. Adam Smith’s warning in 
The Wealth of Nations that where land is cheap, labour is dear was being 
amply borne out.
If this situation were to be reversed, the labour supply would have to 
be enormously increased. And such increase required social engineering on 
a grand scale. Hence in order to compete with other sugar producers, laissez
t
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faire in trade had to be matched by strict social regulation. To an emancipator 
and free trader like Earl Grey, stimulants, “motives to exertion” had to be 
created to force out labour. The colonial reformers, systematic colonisers, had 
advocated emigration financed by land sales. If more Crown land could be 
alienated and more unused plantation land taken up (for plantation systems 
tend to be wasteful of land), there would be less for squatting and subsistence. 
There was indeed a land rush in British Guiana after the end of apprentice­
ship, but by and large the policy of land alienation was not successful, and 
was in any case bedevilled by absenteeism. The policy of making squatting 
illegal on Crown land was equally unsuccessful because it was so seldom 
enforced. It was only later, in the southern African colonies, that land hunger 
was used as an effective producer of labour.
Grey’s principal solution involved the positive sitmulant of direct 
taxation.18 Before emancipation, when he had been parliamentary under­
secretary at the Colonial Offiffice to Lord Goderich, he had suggested a direct 
tax as the solution to the emancipation problem. His suggestion had been 
rejected, but once he became Colonial Secretary in 1846 he set about the 
rapid dissemination of his tax idea, closely allied with forced labour as a 
labour tax for public works throughout the Empire. By the Ceylon Road 
Ordinance of 1847 a labour tax was to be exacted to build roads to connect 
the planters of the high lands of the island with the coast to facilitate 
and therefore reduce the cost of export. This forced labour could be commuted 
for a cash payment. The tax in Mauritius took the form of a levy on Indian 
immigrants not under contract in order to keep them in plantation employ­
ment. In Natal the tax on Africans was to be specifically allied with a 
locations policy (the Natal case will be examined in greater detail below). 
In the Gold Coast, the tax of 1852 was designed to be an alternative to 
Governor Winniett’s call for forced labour for cotton planting. Both this tax 
and one levied in Sierra Leone in the same year were to prove failures. In 
the West Indies direct tax took a very different form; there the planters were 
taxed to pay for the immigration of vast numbers of indentured labourers.
This migration constituted the third, and without question the most 
effective, means of redressing the balance between capital and labour. The 
indentured labour principle developed from the practice of indenturing 
European servants for work in the American and West Indian colonies in the 
seventeenth century. After the intervening slave period, the system was 
resurrected in the nineteenth century for Scots, Irish and Madeira peasantry, 
but the high mortality of these indented migrants forced the plantocracies 
to look elsewhere, to Africans, to Chinese, and above all to Indians, amongst 
whom the mortality was to be no less, but more acceptable. The West African 
trade, which together with the European was instituted in 1840, seemed to 
resemble too closely the slave trade which it was designed to replace, par­
ticularly as agents upon the coast asked no questions about where their 
indentured labourers were coming from. Moreover, it ran counter to the 
ideas of those who wished to destroy human trade, slave or indentured, 
through making labour profitable within Africa itself. Nonetheless, McGregor 
Laird, one of many shipping magnates to develop an important maritime 
interest in the indentured labour traffic, suggested a free, imperial government 
financed, shipping service across the Atlantic to transport black labourers 
back and forth.19 But African trans-Atlantic indentured labour was a failure.
The Chinese system on the other hand was a modified success, and it'
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reflected very well the manner in which indentured labour appeared as a 
substitute for slavery. It began — like slavery — surreptitiously, from several 
ports, of which Amoy was the most important. The first full-scale operations 
were undertaken by the French for Bourbon in 1845 and by the Spanish 
for Cuba in 1847. Like slavery, it swiftly set up a large network of vested 
interests: British, American, French, Spanish, and Dutch shipping interests, 
agents in the foreign communities of Canton, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and 
Macao, and Chinese businessmen in Singapore, Penang, and San Francisco. 
It created abuses — like kidnapping — which forced the Chinese authorities 
to recognise its existence and attempt to regulate it from the 1850s (it had 
hitherto been illegal). The credit-ticket system had already produced the 
widespread serfdom of debt-peonage, even more intolerable than the system 
that had prevailed in South America. Indentured labour, moreover, helped 
to create the Chinese xenophobia, fanned by the communities of foreigners in 
Shanghai, Canton, and other treaty ports, that became such an important 
feature of twentieth century Chinese history. It created a reciprocal xeno­
phobia firstly in Australia and later in British Columbia and California, that 
produced first of all control of immigration and then exclusion. Chinese were 
scattered by it throughout the Pacific area, and into such far-flung places as 
the silver mines of Peru and the plantations of Cuba and British Guiana.20 
The most celebrated case of Chinese indentured labour, that upon the Rand, 
will be examined below.
It was in the securing of Indian indentured labour that capital achieved 
its greatest success. The Indian migration began before the abolition of slavery 
with the provision of indentured labourers to Bourbon in 1829, New South 
Wales in 1837, and subsequently British Guiana before the trade was stopped 
in 1839. It was stopped because of the combined activities of the Anti-Slavery 
Society, primarily concerned about the conditions of the traffic and about the 
rights of blacks in the colonies, of Lord Brougham and other peers in the 
Lords, and of the cries of a new slavery in The Times. At the moment when 
the “apprentices” were being freed, it seemed much too close to the slavery 
it was designed to replace. But the cries of distress of the colonists ensured 
its resumption under tighter Indian regulations in 1842. The equalisation of 
the sugar duties, and die subsequent recession in the sugar colonies, made 
its extension the more necessary. After a faltering start, migration increased 
in the late 1840s until by the early 50s it had become an accepted and per­
manent traffic, which continued until 1917. Mauritius, Jamaica, British 
Guiana, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Grenada, Reunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
French Guana, Danish St. Croix, Dutch Surinam, Natal, and later Kenya and 
Uganda all received Indian indentured labourers. Between 1842 and 1870, 
533 595 Indian indentured emigrants left India, of whom Mauritius took 
two-thirds, and 21% returned.21
There can be no doubt that the scope of indentured labour migration 
saved the plantocracies of the sugar islands. Above all contracted immigrants 
at fixed pay kept wages down. In both British Guiana and Trinidad, the 
stoppage pushed wages up in the early 1840s. In Trinidad, employers had 
to provide houses and plots to cultivate rent-free in order to attract labour.22 
In 1843, the new arrivals from India after the renewal of migration served 
to reduce wages by two-thirds in Mauritius.23 In 1848, the British Guianan 
planters’ desire to reduce wages was promptly effected by the arrival of 5 000 
immigrants.24 In 1849, when there were very few arivals, wages again went up.
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There can, therefore, be little doubt about the effect of indentured migration 
upon wages. Moreover, indentured labour was attractive because it could be 
so much more easily controlled than labour which had its roots, and probably 
some land, within the colonial economies. Another characteristic of the 
plantocracy was that it used labour as a scapegoat for all its ills. But in fact 
their scale of operations, outdated methods, absenteeism, extensive trading 
on credit coupled with over-speculation, and changes in continental tariffs 
all had an effect upon their competitive position. Labour as an external 
threat to survival was to remain a constant cry of colonial capitalists.
I ll
Southern African history has invariably revealed colonial characteristics 
in their extreme form, and this is certainly true of the labour issue. The first 
great labour supply crisis occurred in Natal, and it comes as no surprise to 
discover that it again involved sugar, a notoriously labour intensive staple. 
It is ironical that sugar was developed from 1851, while it was in the immedi­
ately preceding years that the African settlement was taking place. Earl 
Grey had seen the newly acquired Natal as the perfect forcing house for his 
land and tax ideas. He had hoped that in Natal his aims of social and 
economic amalgamation would be achieved by establishing a large number 
of small locations interspersed with white settlement in order to introduce 
Africans at once to European employment. Theophilus Shepstone, diplomatic 
agent and later secretary for native affairs, however, thought differently. The 
1846 Natal land commission was dominated by Shepstone and the missionaries 
Adams and Lindley. Unlike the Coryndon Commission in Rhodesia, the 
chief government surveyor, whose prime interest was obtaining the best land 
for settlers, was kept firmly in check.25 The commission set out to establish 
ten large locations, each of which would have a model mechanical school 
to foster improvements in agriculture, cattle-breeding, and “native industries”. 
There can be no doubt that Shepstone was thinking in terms of self-sufficient 
economic units, for he was later experimenting with cash crops, including 
cotton. Moreover, this fitted with his desire to maintain traditional political 
institutions and all traditional law which did not conflict with natural law. 
Daniel Lindley, one of Shepstone’s principal collaborators, attacked the 
settlers’ desire to give the African population as little land as possible so that 
they would be forced to work. The natives are to be made servants and 
beggars, he said, because the government wishes to attract capitalists and 
make Natal a flourishing colony.26
The commission’s grand design was only imperfectly achieved, however. 
They aroused the ire of the settlers, and in particular of the Boers still in 
the colony. In 1847, Sir Harry Smith, eager as always to conciliate the Boers 
and persuade those who had departed across the Drakensberg to return, 
dismissed the commissioners. A new land commission cut down the newly 
created locations on the grounds that they encouraged indolence. They 
declined to establish any more, and as a result none were created south of 
the Umkomazi River. In 1849 there were seven locations, and Shepstone set 
about collecting the first tax of seven shillings per hut, a tax which was expec­
ted to raise no less than £10 000 for the as yet impecunious colony. But very 
little of this tax was devoted to the improvements Shepstone had envisaged. 
His ideas for agricultural and industrial improvement entirely came to 
nought. White settlement was increasing at precisely this period, and the
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colonial government wished to encourage it. Lt. Governor Pine—appointed 
in 1849—was particularly hostile to both the locations and the mission 
stations.
If the settlers succeeded in cutting down the reserves and thwarting their 
development, they did not succeed in forcing out a sufficient labour supply. 
In addition to the reserves, Natal was a prey to the speculative landowner 
who, as elsewhere in Southern Africa, found “kaffir-farming” both more 
convenient and more lucrative than beneficial occupation of the land. As 
early as 1853 the Natal Native Affairs Commission asserted that the Africans 
of Natal were “rapidly becoming rich and independent”.27 The cries of the 
sugar planters of the coast were directed both against the reserves and the 
kaffir farmers of the interior. At a time when colonial economies searched 
for a lucrative staple, they were a powerful group. Hence, when endogenous 
mechanisms for turning out labour failed, they turned to the exogenous 
mechanism which had proved so helpful elsewhere, immigrant Indian inden­
tured labour.28 From the end of 1860, Indians began to be transported to 
Natal in considerable numbers, and between 1860 and 1866, 6 487 Indians 
arrived. Although the planters insisted that Indians were more expensive 
than African labour, still it is clear that without the Indians conditions and 
wages could have favoured scarce African labour. Moreover, the Indian 
migration was financed partly from a tax on beads and blankets, largely of 
African consumption, a tax expected to yield more than £4 000 per year.29 
The importation of the Indian labourers for the plantations was heavily sub­
sidised by the colonial government to the tune of at least two-fifths of the 
total expenses. And it should be remembered that this was a colonial govern­
ment itself already heavily dependent upon the direct African tax. In these 
ways Africans subsidised the importation of their own competitors.
IV
By the end of the century, labour policies formulated for plantation 
economies were transferred to mining economies, where conditions were in 
many respects the same. In the colonial mining economy, enterprise, capital, 
and labour have again to be brought together into a hinterland of exploitation, 
again production is for export in a Free Trade situation, again a rigid 
social hierarchy is produced which dictates conditions and wages, and 
marginal profitability is used to enhance rather than mitigate the inequalities 
in that hierarchy. Again a constant supply of abundant cheap labour is 
required and cheapness rather than efficiency could ensure the perpetuation 
of the system. Mine owners, like their plantocracy predecessors, discovered 
that because their system could no longer be a closed one, local labour valued 
independence, had alternative routes to the satisfaction of cash wants, and 
could not be controlled as rigidly as imported labour could be. However, at 
Kimberley and upon the Rand, the closed compound system, impossible in 
the plantation setting, was created, partly for security, partly in order to 
exercise fuller control over labour, partly to enable the mining companies 
to win back labourers’ earnings through the truck system of compound 
stores. The closed compound system was, however, inappropriate to Rho­
desian conditions, both because of the smaller scale of activity, and also 
because of the violent opposition of the commercial sector, anxious to avoid 
losing custom to the mines. This fact helps to explain why Rhodesia never 
received non-African indentured labour while the Rand did. It means that
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Rhodesian conditions were more akin to plantation.
The main reason for the closed compound system was that external 
labourers could be repatriated at the end of their contracts. Under the 
plantation schemes this had been difficult if not impossible. Now, where 
labour came from adjacent African territories, the administrations of those 
territories regarded their migrant labourers as an asset which might not be 
diminished, an asset of considerable financial significance to their economies 
whose repeated re-export produced contracting fees, deferred pay and tax. 
Moreover, any fresh tide of Asiatic immigration had to ebb as well as flow 
both for social reasons and above all to avoid competition with other sectors 
like trade and white labour. The Chinese immigration scheme on the Rand 
was the classic case of the latter type of migration.30 At a crucial period 
after the end of the Boer War when African peasants in South Africa 
renewed theur efforts to enter the cash sector via cash cropping31 and 
consequently had the terms of labour on their side, the contracted Chinese 
labourers undercut African wages, providing a breathing space during which 
the frustration of the peasantry could be begun, and additionally ensured that 
the line in white job reservation was drawn unnaturally low.
The greatest similarity between the plantations of the West Indies, the 
Indian Ocean, Natal and the mining concerns of Rhodesia was that in order 
to remain competitive and in the absence of added efficiencies elsewhere, 
labour costs had to be reduced to a minimum. In addition, both sought 
labour after an initial period of coercion. In Rhodesia, this period was short, 
politically disastrous, but briefly effective. With the removal of coercion mine 
owners were forced to attempt to create an abundant supply of labour 
through external immigration. Although considerable dispossession of African 
land rights had already taken place, and the Ndebele cattle economy had 
been totally disrupted, although cash demands were repeatedly increased, 
such endogenous mechanisms proved to be slow to work, and the mines 
turned in consequence to the exogenous mechanisms.
There were three different forms that labour from the outside could take. 
The Rhodesian administration encouraged peoples from Mozambique, the 
Cape, the Transvaal, and Bechuanaland to immigrate permanently to form a 
quarry for a potential labour supply. They attempted to bring in labour from 
further afield, from Ethiopia, Somaliland, and South Arabia, from India and 
from China. And they encouraged a large body of migrant labour from the 
surrounding territories, mostly from the Company’s own domain in the 
North, but also from Nyasaland and Mozambique.32
The Mfengo immigration of 1898 was the most celebrated of the first 
type. The intentions of the scheme were specifically the provision of labour 
and aid in defence against the Ndebele. In the verbal agreement between 
Rhodes and the Mfengo, Rhodes is reported to have said:
We do not love one another so much as to give land without any return
. . . having come to your reserves and your titles I ask you to give at
least three months’ work a year.33
No tax would be levied on those able to produce work receipts. Again in 
1898, Mpefu and 3 000 followers were encouraged to cross the border from 
the Transvaal to settle in the Belingwe District, and precautions were taken 
to ensure that the Boer police did not follow them.34 There was a secretive 
scheme to entice Shangaans of the Gaza state to enter the Melsetter district.33
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A location was allocated in the south to Raditcladi, the brother of Khama.36 
And in February 1901 Temba chiefs from the Cape Colony visited Rhodesia 
with a view to settling, looked over available land and returned to bring up 
their followers “as soon as military exigencies permit”.37 Although most of 
these schemes proved either abortive or short-lived, the “beggar-my-neighbour” 
policy continued. In 1917, several thousand refugees from the “pacification” 
of Makombe’s rising were encouraged to settle and were provided with famine 
relief specifically on the understanding that their menfolk would go out to 
work.38 These movements perfectly reveal the land-labour syndrome. The 
Resident Commissioner, Sir Marshall Clarke, disapproved of the earlier 
immigration schemes on the grounds of infringement of the rights of the 
indigenous inhabitants of Rhodesia. The Colonial Office was sceptical of the 
Company’s ability or desire to provide these peoples with sufficient land, and 
so Chamberlain informed Milner that all such immigrants should be made 
aware of the land and labour situation.39 Colonial Office suspicions were 
again aroused by the veiled threats of the chief native commissioners of 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland in the indabas which they held in 1899, 
in which they announced that if local peoples would not go out to work, then 
other peoples would be brought in and would take over their land.40 This 
presumably was the operation of Rhodes’s “inexorable law”.
The second type of immigrant labour was of course indentured labour, 
and here the Company was prepared to go to bizarre lengths in its attempt 
to ape the efforts of the sugar planters. The projects to extract labour from 
the Gulf of Aden area exhibited all the worst aspects of the indentured labour 
system. In Ethiopia arrangements were set in train for recruiting labour 
without King Menelik’s approval; in Somaliland, labourers were kidnapped, 
whipped from under the French imperial noses at Djibouti; in South Arabia, 
Sultans were tipped, labour agents circulated and exaggerated stories told; 
an island in Aden harbour with the unfortunate name of Slave Island was 
taken over as a depot; the element of compulsion in recruiting is amply 
revealed in the case of one party of 338 secured at Lahej: 150 “deserted” 
on the way to the medical centre at Sheikh Othman, 60 refused to submit 
to the medical examination, 32 were rejected as unfit, leaving 96, of whom one 
was reclaimed by his mother!41
Yet despite the fiasco of Arab labour — those who survived the obstacle 
course and actually arrived in Rhodesia refused to go underground and were 
sent home — other schemes for indentured labour were got up. From late 
1899 onwards a great controversy developed about the use of Indian or 
Chinese labour.42 Examples of the successful migration and employment of 
both were adduced; the great Indian famine of 1897 was raising emigration 
from the sub-continent, particularly from Bihar, to a new peak; shipping 
interests, in the shape of Sir G. S. Mackenzie and the British India Steam 
Navigation Company, were as always closely involved; draft legislation was 
even prepared to regulate the influx. But these ideas were scotched for a 
variety of reasons. In the first place, Curzon expressed nothing but viceregal 
contempt for the Company administration. Secondly, these policies were 
entirely the policies of the mining sector, already arousing the considerable 
opposition of the farming and commercial sectors who saw in Asiatic immi­
grants only the Yellow Peril and, more importantly, a possible loss of trade. 
Moreover, few outside the mining community were convinced that the 
restrictive regulations holding Asians to mining activity only and ensuring
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their repatriation at the termination of their contracts could be enforced.43 
A spectre of hordes of Asian traders and market gardeners arose before their 
eyes. So far as these restrictions were concerned, the Chinese were preferred, 
since it was easier to restrict them than British subjects from India. Moreover, 
the Colonial Office refused to countenance separate immigration for Southern 
Rhodesia, but insisted that the decision could only be taken for the whole 
of southern Africa, despite Rhodesia protestations that she was geographically 
isolated and had her own port of entry in Beira.
The Colonial Office was, however, prepared to be far less obstructive 
with regard to the third type of immigrant labour, labour from Northern 
Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Mozambique. Two of Chamberlain’s doctrines 
had become dogmas enshrined in the Colonial Office. One was that Rhodesia 
was economically indivisible from the rest of South Africa; the other was 
that the Company must be given a free hand in developing its estates to the 
north, even if that development involved only the use of the territories as 
labour quarries. It was through this supply that Rhodesian capital was able to 
secure the control it required over wages and conditions. Moreover, it was 
an effect which operated sector by sector. At first it was the mines, through 
their treatment, high death rates, and defaulting on wages, that were un­
popular. Later, with the rapid development of capitalist agriculture from 
1908, the mines were to become the lesser evil, with better conditions, higher 
wages, and a more attractive social life, than the agricultural sector. Once 
the mines were able to satisfy their requirements from “voluntary” migration, 
it was the agricultural sector, in effect a new plantocracy, which required 
and received an infusion of cheap immigrant labour.
Although, as we have seen, the mines had toyed with the idea of 
overseas indentured migration, they recognised from the beginning that their 
principal source of supply would be from adjacent African territories. At 
first they attempted to use a combination of individual recruiters and 
Company officials — like Robert Coryndon the administrator of North 
Western Rhodesia44—as their labour agents, but from 1899 a series of labour 
bureaux, reconstructed in 1900, 1903, 1906, and 1912, abandoned in 1933 
because of the Depression, and each subsidised in one way or another by 
the administration, set about the mobilisation of labour. The purposes of the 
bureaux, to hold down wages by boosting supply, and to provide employers 
with greater control over their labourers, were never in doubt. In 1900, one 
official, Alfred Drew, arguing for native commissioner involvement in 
recruitment, wrote “The Labour Bureau might still preserve its combination 
for keeping wages down and so forth”.45 Again in 1900 the Chief Native 
Commissioner, Mashonaland, H. M. Taberer, referring to the desertions of 
some 100 Ngonis from the Bonsor Mine, wrote;
The great object in importing these boys is to keep the rate of wages
down, and while I consider that this object should always be kept in
view, it appears that the authorities at the Bonsor Mine went a little
too far in their endeavours to secure a cheap labour . . ,4S
That the bureaux were designed to keep Africans in employment for longer 
periods at lower wages—and supply unpopular employers who could not 
secure their labour supply by any other means—became so well known that 
it very soon had to suspend its operations within Southern Rhodesia and 
concentrate solely on the northern territories. There, Africans pressed by the
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pecuniary demands of their administrations, with little opportunity for cash 
cropping, and facing a long dangerous journey to the south, had less freedom 
of choice. As late as 1914 it was reported to the Colonial Office that officials 
were handing over tax defaulters to the Bureau and that Bureau messengers 
were acting as a “press gang”.47
Within Southern Rhodesia, the mines faced a more independent popula­
tion, capable of meeting most of their cash demands by cash-cropping and 
sale of stock, and able to migrate to better wages, better conditions, and laxer 
liquor laws, on the Rand. The contemporary chambers of mines were them­
selves in no doubt of this. In 1902 the president of the Bulawayo Chamber 
of Mines asserted that over 90% of grain produced in the country was 
African produced, and suggested that the mines should themselves go into 
co-operative farming to cut out the “native producer”.48 Each year the 
chamber of mines re-produced with growing alarm figures of increasing 
prosperity in the peasant sector. In 1904 the Bulawayo Chamber attempted 
to show that the balance between peasant income and contribution to revenue 
was £762 562.49 Moreover, the spirit of independence in the local population 
was revealed in considerable migration to the Rand, particularly from all 
areas south of Fort Victoria, a migration which was ironically stimulated by 
the Rhodesian Bureau itself. In 1904, the slump year in Rhodesia, 4 613 
recruits were sent to the Rand. Not even WNLA’s insistence on twelve months’ 
contracts from that year could in any way inhibit the stream of migrants, 
much to the surprise of Rhodesian employers who were lucky if they got three 
months’ work out of local recruits.50
Indigenous labour in the early years of the century could indeed have 
had the terms of employment on its side. Before the operation of the endo­
genous mechanisms — increasing cash demands, movements to the reserves, 
and the reduction of those reserves — immigrant labour constituted con­
siderable competition for indigenous labour and the means by which wages 
could be held down. Hence these immigrants from adjacent territories played 
the same role vis-h-vis indigenous labour as the Chinese scheme, 1905-1910, 
played upon the Rand. The increase in migrant labour to Rhodesia as a 
result of the Boer War produced reductions in wages in late 1901. In 1903, 
when immigrant labour combined with increased internal supply because of 
poor conditions in the peasant sector, wages were again reduced.5' In 1904, 
the slump year, F. G. Elliott, inspector of native compounds for division no. 1, 
asserted in his report that the local man was unable to compete with the 
immigrant and was being refused work at the mines.52 Again in 1905 increased 
supply resulted in a wage reduction.53 In March 1906, the Chief Native 
Commissioner, Matabeleland, gave average wages as 20s to 25s per month 
for surface work, and 35s to 40s for underground work.54 In his December 
1907 report, he gave wages of Bureau recruits from North Eastern Rhodesia: 
22s 6d for 30 working days in underground work, and 15s for surface.55 As 
can be seen from table I, it is from 1907 that the proportion of internal 
labour begins to go down. There could be no better demonstrations of the 
effects of immigrant labour.
The development of capitalist agriculture in Rhodesia produced not only 
competition for the African producer, but also an onslaught upon the mining 
industry. The cornerstone of this policy was the Private Locations Ordinance 
of 1908 which limited the number of heads of families who could be kept on
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alienated land to 40 per 1 500 acres. The result was the first of the great 
movements upon the land which have characterised twentieth century Rho­
desian history, and the short-term result was a marked decline in the 
indigenous labour supply. Table I reveals that during times of disaster in the 
peasant sector, the proportion of indigenous labour in mining actually 
declines, as in the years 1911-1916, in the early twenties when the peasant 
market colapsed, and during the Depression. In these periods external migrants 
are no longer a substitute for reluctant indigenous labour; they constitute, 
as in 1904, competition in times of labour glut because of the greater controls 
that can be placed upon them. During these periods, as the Chief Native 
Commissioner’s reports and recent oral evidence confirm, indigenous labour 
in abundant supply is rejected in favour of external labour.
The development of the European farming sector created another even 
more unpopular source of employment, and again it was the labour bureau 
which set about tiding it over initial difficulties. Table II shows the percentages 
of indigenous and alien labour in employment other than mining, while 
Table III shows the dramatic shift from mining and general employment to 
agriculture in the labour bureau’s supply pattern, although the bureau was 
so heavily capitalised by the mines that effectively the mining sector was 
subsidising the farming. Again the role of the bureau was clear. As Coghlan’s 
secretary frankly put it, the Bureau’s functions were:
1. To supply unpopular and isolated employers.
2. To maintain an organisation ready to meet a possible sudden falling 
off of ‘voluntary’ labour or increase of demand.
3. To keep down the wages of ‘voluntary’ labour. (In this capacity it 
is made more use of than is generally suppossed.)56
In the farming industry, as to a lesser extent in the mining, indigenous labour 
bora the brunt of the cycle of booms and slumps. Immigrant labour which 
facilitated the boom was invariably used to tide over the slump. As successive 
managers of the labour bureaux repeatedly pointed out, Rhodesian employers 
were totally unwilling to create either standard conditions or minimum wages. 
In consequence large numbers of “work-seekers”, even in the farming sector, 
headed for the Transvaal, while some Nyasaland farm labourers were found 
to be passing through Rhodesia since Rhodesian wages were not much better 
than those obtaining in Nyasaland.57
In these ways the terms of employment were turned against indigenous 
Africans and a breathing space secured in which the frustration and com­
pression of the peasantry could be effected. This use of the external mechanism 
to swing the balance back in favour of capital was of long standing. The 
Colonial Office, while solicitous about death rates, did everything to facilitate 
the provision of labour from adjacent territories. In West Africa, the peasant 
producer was encouraged, but in southern Africa there can be no doubt that 
successive secretaries of state, from Chamberlain to Milner at least—with the 
sole exception of Harcourt58—were closely tied by personal relationship and 
financial interest with southern African capital. Of even greater significance 
is the fact that when Harcourt gave qualified support to Sir William Manning 
in his attempt to shut off Nyasaland labour from Rhodesia in 1911, the 
officials of the Colonial Office regarded it as intolerable that the labour 
of Nyasaland should be locked up in this way.59
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V
Colonial labour policy in the nineteenth century was conditioned by the 
apotheosis of labour in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, by 
the notions of tropical abundance and tropical indolence, and the related 
assumption that little or no value lay in indigenous economies. With the 
abolition of slavery and the removal of the concept of labour as property, 
labour enjoyed a powerful position vis-a-vis capital, particularly where extra 
land was available for subsistence. This imbalance in favour of labour had 
to be redressed, such that laissez faire in trade had to be matched with careful 
social regulation. Several colonial mechanisms were introduced to achieve 
this regulation. Internal mechanisms included the restriction of land available 
for subsistence and the levying of direct taxation. The external mechanism, 
which proved to be the more successful, was the introduction of large numbers 
of indentured labourers who served to hold wages and conditions down. In 
southern Africa this external mechanism was used as a stop-gap until the 
internal mechanisms could be made to work. By the operation of these 
mechanisms the competitive position on the world market of both the sugar 
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1904 22 78 7 533* — — — — —
1905 31 69 15 382 — — — — —
1906 40 60 19 852 — — — 100 0
1907 38 62 27 796 — . — . — 100 0
1908 34 66 30  847 — — — . 96 4
1909 33 67 32  720 — — — 75 25
1910 34 66 37 824 — — . — 75 25
1911 37 63 38 656 — — — 82 18
1912 37 63 34 654 — — — 56 44
1913 35 65 33 423 71 29 39 773 49 51
1914 32 68 36  363 65 35 45 064 49 52
1915 31 69 37 916 65 35 43 247 60 4 0
1916 31 69 40  214 60 4 0 39  633 4 6 54
1917 37 63 38 664 57 43 4 4  948 47 53
1918 34 66 32 199 58 42 4 6  477 56 44
1919 33 67 30  678 54 46 5 0 1 2 0 55 45
1920 25 75 36 875 53 47 52  272 41 59
1921 21 79 37 605 44 56 76 573 37 63
1922 26 74 35 674 34 66 96 000 34 66
1923 28 72 36 681 39 61 1 0 1 0 0 0 50 50
1924 27 73 41 372 38 62 100 800 35 65
1925 27 73 39 644 41 59 107 561 35 65
1926 27 73 40  874 52 48 133 133 40 60
1927 29 71 4 0  636 51 49 137 888 24 76
1928 29 71 43 703 53 47 13 4 1 5 1 33 67
1929 27 73 46  811 51 49 1 1 6 1 8 8 35 65
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1930 26 74 45 337 51 49 111490 20 80
1931 24 76 35 202 47 53 129 060 12 88
1932 26 74 36 050 52 48 121 348 — —
1933 30 70 48 269 49 51 123 027 — —
1934 31 69 62 339 48 52 121 968 — —
1935 29 71 76 226 — — — — —
1936 28 72 84 092 — — — — —
1937 26 74 90 600 — — — — —
SOURCES: Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, Bulawayo, and Chamber of Mines, Salisbury, 
Annual Reports, and Annual Reports of the Chief Native Commissioner. 
* The figures for 1903 and 1904 are for Matabeleland only.
Ill represents the percentage of total recruits supplied to mines and general employment
and to farms. The R.N.L.B. was wound up during the Depression because of the glut 
of labour.
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